Do ownership structures affect the risk incentive provided by managerial portfolio holdings? An empirical analysis of UK alternative investment market companies by Pinto, Helena
Strathprints Institutional Repository
Pinto, Helena (2010) Do ownership structures affect the risk incentive provided by managerial
portfolio holdings? An empirical analysis of UK alternative investment market companies. In: EFMA
2010, 2010-01-01, Aarhus, Denmark.
Strathprints is designed to allow users to access the research output of the University of Strathclyde.
Copyright c© and Moral Rights for the papers on this site are retained by the individual authors
and/or other copyright owners. You may not engage in further distribution of the material for any
profitmaking activities or any commercial gain. You may freely distribute both the url (http://
strathprints.strath.ac.uk/) and the content of this paper for research or study, educational, or
not-for-profit purposes without prior permission or charge.
Any correspondence concerning this service should be sent to Strathprints administrator:
mailto:strathprints@strath.ac.uk
http://strathprints.strath.ac.uk/
a
 Both authors are from the Department of Accounting and Finance, Strathclyde University, Glasgow, 
Scotland, UK. Contact author: Helena.pinto@strath.ac.uk. Tel: +441415483891. 
b 
a.marshall@strath.ac.uk   1 
Do Ownership Structures Affect the Risk Incentive Provided by Managerial 
Portfolio Holdings? An Empirical Analysis of UK Alternative Investment 
Market Companies  
 
 
Helena Pinto
a
 and Andrew Marshall
b 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 2 
Do Ownership Structures Affect the Risk Incentive Provided by Managerial 
Portfolio Holdings? An Empirical Analysis of UK Alternative Investment 
Market Companies  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Abstract 
  
This paper analyzes the wealth and risk incentive effects of managerial options and 
shareholdings on the hedging probability of UK listed Alternative Investment Market 
(AIM) companies. We find that the wealth incentive effect provided by managerial 
option holdings increases the hedging likelihood. On the contrary, the wealth 
incentive effect provided by managerial shareholdings decreases the hedging 
likelihood. Further tests show that the incentive effect provided by managerial 
shareholdings is significantly different if managers are not substantial shareholders of 
the company. Managers with substantial ownership are significantly less risk averse. 
Thus, the size and ownership structure characteristics of AIM companies seem to 
result in similarities between managers‟ and owners‟ behavior. 
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1. Introduction 
 
Since the arguments of Smith and Stulz (1985) on managerial risk aversion 
and corporate hedging, several empirical studies have analyzed the relation between 
managerial options and shareholdings and risk management practices (see e.g., 
Haushalter, 2000; Knopf, Nam, and Thornton, 2002; Rogers, 2002). Typically, as a 
measure of managerial risk aversion, some of the studies use the percentage of 
shareholdings. Other studies use variables based on the number or value of shares and 
options, or the wealth and risk incentive provided by those options and shares. In this 
paper, we argue that in small and closely held companies, both the scale of the 
incentives (amount of the incentives) and the level of ownership (percentage of 
shareholdings) should be considered when testing the effect of managerial portfolio 
holdings on corporate risk management practices. Our contribution to the literature is 
twofold. First, we estimate managers‟ wealth (delta) and risk (vega) incentives 
provided by option holdings, taking into consideration important option 
characteristics that can impact managers‟ attitudes toward risk. Second, we do not 
concentrate on large, widely held companies but on small closely held companies 
listed on the UK Alternative Investment Market (AIM). This sample choice is due to 
their particular ownership and governance structures that have implications on 
financial decision making and agency cost relations in these companies. 
Our first contribution arises from the fact that, contrary to previous literature, 
(e.g., Knopf,  Nam, and Thornton, 2002; Rogers, 2002) we do not use the Black and 
Scholes equation (BSE) to estimate the managerial wealth and risk incentives 
provided by option holdings. We argue that the BSE does not allow for the 
consideration of important characteristics of managerial options, for instance the 
 4 
vesting period or the likelihood that a manager could be fired or could leave before 
the option vests. Also, of potentially greater importance for our paper, faced with an 
incomplete market, managers often exercise their options long before maturity 
(Hudart and Lang, 1996; Carpenter, 1998). In this paper, we estimate the vega and 
delta of managerial option holdings using the model proposed by Cvitanic, Wiener, 
and Zapatero (2008). We suggest that the model of Cvitanic, Wiener, and Zapatero 
(2008) allows us to better consider the characteristics of the options held by the 
managers of companies in our sample.  
Our second contribution is based on our sample selection of companies listed 
in the AIM market. We argue that this sample provides advantages in studying 
managerial risk aversion and corporate hedging. The AIM market is dominated by 
small market capitalization companies, has less demanding rules for shareholders‟ 
approval and corporate governance requirements, and has no minimum free float 
requirement. These features mean that these companies are distinctive in terms of 
ownership structure and are considerably different from the companies that are 
normally considered in the risk management literature. Consequently, the risk effect 
of managerial portfolio holdings suggested by Smith and Stulz (1985) is not 
necessarily observed in these companies.
1
 Thus, we investigate if the incentive 
provided by managerial portfolio holdings in small and closely held companies has a 
different effect on the hedging likelihood than the incentive provided in larger and in 
more widely owned companies.  
Our results show that if the incentives provided by managerial share and 
option holdings are treated as exogenous variables, then the variables do have an 
impact on the manager‟s decision to hedge. The delta of options has a significant 
                                                 
1
 Some of the literature has failed to find a relation between managerial portfolio holdings and risk 
management practices in large widely held companies. 
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positive effect on the hedging probability, and the vega of the option holdings has a 
negative (though not statistically significant) effect on the hedging probability. We 
find that the wealth effect provided by shareholdings is significant but negatively 
related to the hedging probability. This result could be explained by the fact that the 
large majority of the companies traded on the AIM are small or because they are 
closely held. We test if the incentives provided by managerial shares and option 
holdings of the smaller companies in the AIM market are significantly different from 
the incentives provided by the larger companies in this market.
2
 We find that the 
managerial incentives do not differently affect the hedging likelihood according to the 
size of the company (in our sample).  
Furthermore, we test if the scale of the separation of the roles of 
manager/shareholder affects the impact of the incentive provided by managerial 
holdings on the hedging likelihood. Our results show that the scale of the separation 
of the roles of manager/shareholder does affect the wealth incentive provided by 
shareholdings but not the wealth and risk incentive provided by option holdings. In 
companies where managers do not hold a significant proportion of the company 
shares, the wealth incentive provided by managers‟ shareholding significantly 
increases the hedging likelihood. This finding is consistent with treating managerial 
incentive holdings as endogenous variables and with re-defining our hedging decision 
variable as a “derivatives usage” variable. Therefore, the size and ownership structure 
characteristics of AIM companies seem to result in managers‟ actions that are similar 
to owners‟ actions. This finding could be explained by the fact that since they are 
                                                 
2
 The majority of the larger companies in our sample would still be classified as small in other studies. 
The largest company in our sample in 2006 (the year of our analysis) has a market capitalization of 
£853 million, and the smallest has £100 thousand. Such a large size difference could have an effect on 
the incentive provided by managerial shares and option holdings. Therefore, we believe that it is 
important to test if the incentive provided by managerial shares and option holdings of very small 
companies can be different from the incentive provided by managerial shares and option holdings of 
larger (less small) companies. 
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significant owners, these managers perceive company value as their own wealth, or 
because managers that are substantial shareholders are more confident in their 
capabilities and in the future prospects of the company, they are more willing to 
accept risk.  Thus, risk-aversion agency conflicts due to the separation of the roles of 
manager/shareholder do not seem to be extensive in closely held AIM companies. 
Consequently, managers of AIM companies seem to act considerably differently from 
the managers of the widely owned companies normally considered in the risk 
management literature.      
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the 
relevant literature on the effect of managerial incentives on risk management practices 
and hedging in small companies. It also explains our intuition for using a model other 
than the BSE to calculate the incentives provided by managerial option holdings. The 
characteristics of the AIM market and the attractions of this market for our study are 
presented in section 3. In section 4, we present our variables and develop our 
hypotheses. Section 5 presents details of our sample and our results, and section 6 
concludes. 
 
2. Literature review 
 
2.1. Previous studies of managerial incentives as determinants of corporate hedging 
 
Concentrating on large, widely held companies, Smith and Stulz (1985) show 
that through the design of adequate compensation contracts, companies can induce 
managers to follow an optimal hedging policy (due to managerial risk aversion, under 
their model framework, an optimal hedging policy would be achieved if the manager 
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hedges less). Since managerial holdings of shares and options, particularly, result 
from current and previous years‟ compensation contracts,3 the shares held by the 
manager provide an incentive to hedge more and the options held by the manager can 
provide an incentive to hedge less.  The argument that options can induce the manager 
to take more risk is challenged by Amihud and Lev (1981) and Lambert, Larcker, and 
Verrecchia (1991). They suggest that undiversified risk-averse managers can become 
even more risk averse as their portfolio of options increases. Guay (1999) argues that 
executive options can provide both an incentive to increase (through vega) and 
decrease (through delta) company risk. Since options link the managers‟ wealth to the 
companies‟ value, they will increase the risk of the portfolio of the manager.  
Therefore, options can provide a risk-aversion incentive. On the other hand, since the 
options‟ value increases with volatility, they could provide the manager with an 
incentive to increase risk. Ross (2004) argues that managerial shareholdings can 
induce risk-taking behavior and, conversely, managerial option holdings can induce 
risk aversion.    
Early empirical studies on the effect of managers‟ portfolio holdings on risk 
management policies have produced mixed results (see Tufano, 1996; Geczy, Minton, 
and Schrand, 1997; Gay and Nam, 1998; Haushalter, 2000). Spano (2007) is, to our 
knowledge, the most recent test of the relation between managerial ownership and 
corporate hedging considering the same country as this study (larger UK companies 
from the Main Market of the London Stock Exchange). His overall results suggest 
that in the UK, managerial share ownership does not affect the decision to hedge. 
Moreover, for some model specifications, Spano (2007) finds that the relation 
between managerial ownership and the decision to hedge is negative (though not 
                                                 
3
 This is mainly true for managerial options‟ holdings since managers can trade on their share holdings, 
but the same is not true for options granted under compensation schemes. 
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statistically significant).  The mixed results in these US and UK studies could be due 
to the managerial risk incentive proxies used (normally the number or value of shares 
and options held by the executive director or the percentage of shareholdings) since 
those proxies fail to adequately capture the risk incentive effect provided by 
managers‟ portfolio holdings.  
Knopf,  Nam, and Thornton (2002) and Rogers (2002)
4 
measure the sensitivity 
of CEO equity (-like) portfolio holdings to both company value and company risk 
(delta and vega) and use those measures as proxies for the manager‟s wealth and risk 
incentives. Both studies conclude that hedging activity is positively related to the 
shares and options‟ sensitivity to share prices (delta) and is negatively related to the 
options‟ sensitivity to risk (vega). The latter result is not statistically significant in 
Knopf, Nam, and Thornton (2002). Contrary to Knopf,  Nam, and Thornton (2002), 
Rogers (2002) models the CEO risk incentives and hedging policy as endogenous 
variables that could explain the difference in the results of both studies.
5
 The proxy 
used in these two studies, the manager‟s portfolio sensitivity to both changes in 
company value and risk (delta and vega), is a better proxy for the manager‟s wealth 
and risk incentives. However, the measure of managerial incentives provided by 
options can still have some problems due to the specific characteristics of options 
granted on company equity.  
 
2.2. Characteristics of managerial wealth and risk incentives 
 
                                                 
4
 Rajgopal and Shevlin (2002) also analyze the relation between companies hedging and managerial 
risk incentives using vega as a proxy for managerial risk incentive. Consistent with Smith and Stulz 
(1985), the authors find a negative relation between hedging and managerial risk incentives. 
5
 Rogers (2002) shows a significant negative relation between the managerial risk incentive (measured 
as the ratio of vega to delta) and hedging. 
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The majority of options granted to managers are American, i.e., they can be 
exercised at any time. Knopf, Nam, and Thornton (2002) and Rogers (2002) treat the 
options as European, i.e., the manager is assumed to only be able to exercise the 
options at maturity. An American option on a non-dividend paying share will never be 
exercised before maturity since (before maturity) a non-dividend paying option is 
always worth more than its payoff. Therefore, its value is the same as a European 
option. If holders do not wish to continue holding the option, they would be better off 
selling it than exercising it. However, (some) companies do pay dividends and, more 
importantly, managers cannot sell their options and are constrained on hedging them 
(the manager faces an incomplete market). As a consequence, it could be (sub)optimal 
for managers to exercise their options before maturity and, thus, the treatment of an 
American option as if it were European possibly leads to a bias in the results. 
Intuitively, we would expect the American feature to affect the value of the managers‟ 
options portfolio and the wealth and risk incentives provided by that portfolio of 
options. More precisely, if managers are able to sell their options, we would expect 
the value of the options to be understated in the literature due to the inappropriate 
treatment of the American feature. On the other hand, since managers are not allowed 
to sell their options and are constrained on hedging them, they could decide to 
exercise those options, perhaps due to liquidity issues or if they leave the company, 
before it would have been optimal from the perspective of an unconstrained holder. 
The treatment of the American feature as if it were European can overstate the value 
of the options and their wealth and risk incentives. Thus, it is possible that some of the 
results found in the existing literature are biased due to an imprecise treatment of the 
options exercise policy. 
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Another characteristic of these studies that can potentially bias the results is 
the approximation method used to determine the wealth and risk incentive provided 
by the managers‟ option holdings. The approximation method suggested by Core and 
Guay (2002) can bias the results, particularly in situations where the manager‟s 
portfolio contains a considerable amount of out-of-the-money options. The authors 
argue that the bias resulting from implementing their approximation method (if the 
manager‟s portfolio of options has out-of-the-money options) is likely to be important 
in studies where the managerial incentives are measured as the sum of the incentives 
provided by options and shares, i.e., when researchers measure managerial incentives 
as the sum of, for example, the delta of shares and option holdings (this variable is 
used in Knopf, Nam, and Thornton, 2002 and Rogers, 2002). 
Other characteristics of the options, that have not been considered in previous 
studies and could affect their wealth and risk incentives, are the vesting period and the 
likelihood that the manager could leave or be fired before the options mature. The 
majority of options granted to managers in both the US and the UK have a vesting 
period of three years.
6
 During this vesting period, managers cannot exercise their 
options. Brisley (2006) suggests that calendar vesting schedules are unlikely to offer 
correct incentives for risk taking.  If an option is deeply in the money and has already 
vested, the risk-averse manager will rationally exercise it.
7
 If an option is deeply in 
the money and has not vested, it could lead the manager to seek to reduce risk, i.e., to 
hedge more. The intuition is that risk-averse managers holding non-vested, deeply in–
the-money options, will want to avoid the risk of their options falling out-of-the-
                                                 
6
 The UK Combined Code suggests that options should have a vesting period of at least three years. 
The Combined Code on Corporate Governance sets out standards of good practice for UK companies 
listed on the Main Market of the London Stock Exchange in relation to issues such as board 
composition and development, remuneration, accountability and audit, and relations with shareholders. 
7
 Huddart and Lang (1996) and Carpenter (1998) show that managers tend to exercise their options 
long before maturity. 
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money. Therefore, vesting periods can affect the options‟ wealth and risk incentives. 
Moreover, the likelihood that managers will leave the company before their options 
mature could also affect the options‟ value and the incentives provided by those 
options. If managers leave the company and hold unvested options, they will forfeit 
the options. On the other hand, if they leave the company and hold vested options, 
they will have a short period of time to exercise the options.
8
 
In this paper we calculate the managers‟ wealth and risk incentives using the 
model developed in Cvitanic, Wiener, and Zapatero (2008). The model allows the 
consideration of some of the important characteristics of options granted to managers, 
for instance the vesting period, the possibility that the manager could leave or be fired 
before maturity, and the fact that managers could decide to exercise their options 
before maturity. 
 
2.3. Hedging determinants in small companies 
 
The literature on the determinants of corporate hedging concentrates on large 
companies and often excludes small companies.
9
 However, there are a few 
exceptions. For example, Pennings and Garcia (2004) analyze the determinants of 
corporate hedging of small- and medium-sized companies in the Dutch pork 
marketing channels. Using a generalised mixture regression model, the authors group 
the companies into segments of managers who behave similarly.  Then they study the 
                                                 
8
 In the US, managers have up to three months to exercise their options after they leave the company 
(Cvitanic, Wiener, and Zapatero, 2008). 
9
 As an example, Purnanandam (2008) analyzes the relation between financial distress and corporate 
risk management, excluding from his sample the first quartile of the size distribution. This literature 
argues that company size is a corporate hedging determinant although often arguing that the direction 
of the effect is ambiguous. Moreover, it is not clear how to interpret some of the results since the 
literature uses proxies for size, which depend on the size range of the selected sample. In other words, 
the same company can be considered small or large depending on which sample it is included. This 
could explain the ambiguous results concerning the effect of size on corporate hedging.   
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determinants of derivative usage for each segment. They conclude that the 
determinants vary by segment and that the differences can be partially explained by 
factors like ownership structure. Vickery (2008) analyzes the choice of fixed-rate 
loans (compared to floating-rate loans) by small companies as a risk management 
tool. The results support the hypothesis that financially constrained small companies 
that are more exposed to interest rate movements match significantly more than 
nonfinancially constrained small companies. The author finds that managerial 
ownership is not a significant determinant of company risk management.  
 
 
3. The AIM (Alternative Investment Market) 
 
The AIM was launched in the UK in 1995 with the objective of attracting 
small, high-growth British companies. The AIM has developed significantly and now 
attracts not only British companies but also companies from several overseas 
countries, closed-end property, and investment funds (Arcot, Black, and Owen, 2007). 
The market is still dominated (in terms of number of companies) by small market 
capitalization companies. The large majority of the companies listed in the AIM 
(82%) have a market capitalization less than £50 million, with 69% of the companies 
having a market capitalization below £25 million.
10
 
In terms of the number of companies being traded, the AIM is larger than the 
Main Market of the London Stock Exchange. In May 2009, there were 1,438 
companies listed on the AIM (the Main Market had 1,054 companies). Since there is 
no requirement for companies to be traded before admission, the AIM is considered 
                                                 
10
 In the UK Main Market, the large majority (59%) has a market capitalization larger than £50 million, 
with only 25% having a market capitalization less than £25 million (LSE statistics, May 2009). 
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mainly as a feeder of the Main Market, but this feature of the market is no longer the 
case for all companies. Some companies that are traded on the Main Market choose to 
move to the AIM to achieve visibility amongst their peer companies (Arcot, Black, 
and Owen, 2007), and some larger companies choose to remain in the AIM despite 
fulfilling the requirements of the Main Market. The latter group could choose to 
remain in the AIM because the requirements in corporate governance and shareholder 
approval are less stringent than in the Main Market. The less demanding rules for 
shareholder approval and corporate governance requirements are certainly attractive, 
particularly for less-structured, small, high-growth companies, but it could result in 
lower protection of shareholder rights. In other words, it could lead to potential 
agency conflict between managers and shareholders. 
The other two aspects of the AIM that are attractive for smaller companies are 
the lack of a minimum requirement of capital being raised
11
 and no minimum free- 
float requirement. The lack of a float requirement makes these companies unique in 
terms of ownership structure. In 2007, institutional investors owned 60% of the shares 
being traded on the AIM, but this investment was made mainly in relatively high 
market capitalization companies. About half of the remaining 40% of shares were 
owned by directors, employees, and members of the founding family (Arcot, Black, 
and Owen, 2007). Thus, the ownership structure of these companies is considerably 
different from the large, widely owned companies, which are normally considered in 
the risk management literature in the UK and US.  
The large majority of the shares traded on the AIM are owned by a small 
group of institutional investors. Therefore, those companies are more likely to be 
adequately monitored and are less likely to be exposed to manager/shareholder 
                                                 
11
 The market enables companies to raise relatively small amounts of capital, normally from £10 
million upwards. In the UK Main Market, the majority of the companies raising money from January to 
May 2009 raised £100 million or more. 
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agency conflicts. Also, in a large proportion of the remaining companies, the owner is 
also a manager with a large portfolio of shares in their company (in some cases in our 
sample, around 90% of the shares). Since agency conflicts between manager and 
shareholder arise due to the separation of the two roles, under the agency model 
framework it is likely that in those companies there would be a lower level of agency 
disputes. Moreover, in terms of the focus of this study, closely held, smaller 
companies are likely to have smaller management teams that would be easier to 
monitor both internally and externally. Conversely, it can be argued that small 
management structures can result in agency conflicts since risk management policies, 
and also the management of the different corporate functions, can depend on the 
opinion of a single individual or a very small team of individuals. The less demanding 
rules for shareholder approval and corporate governance requirements can also result 
in exacerbated agency costs; however, the one that dominates financial decision 
making is an empirical question.  
 
4. Variables and hypotheses development 
 
The majority of the studies on hedging determinants use derivative holdings as 
a proxy for corporate hedging. However, by concentrating on derivative holdings, the 
studies fail to consider that companies commonly use internal/operating hedging 
techniques like duration hedging and cash flow matching. Moreover, given our 
analysis on AIM-quoted companies that could lack financial sophistication, we should 
expect that if they decide to hedge their FX and interest rate exposures, they would 
initially consider the use of internal/operating hedging techniques. Thus, if we use the 
hedging proxies commonly utilised in the literature, we could classify as non-hedger 
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companies that actively hedge their FX and interest rate exposures.  Therefore, to 
define if a company hedges or not, we look in the annual report for the details of the 
company‟s risk management policy. If the company uses derivatives to hedge its 
exposure and/or if it uses other internal risk management techniques like duration or 
cash flow matching, we classify the company as a hedger. The hedging variable is a 
binary variable that takes the value of one if the company hedges and zero if the 
company does not hedge. In section 5 we present full details of our data source and 
sample.  
 
4.1 Managerial ownership incentives as determinants of corporate hedging 
 
Following Knopf, Nam, and Thornton (2002) and Rogers (2002), we 
recognize that managers‟ portfolios of shares and options can provide two distinct 
incentives to avoid or increase the company‟s risk. Since shares and options link 
managers‟ wealth to company value and since managers are constrained on 
diversifying their portfolio, shares and options can give the manager an incentive to 
hedge more than would be optimal from the perspective of an unconstrained 
shareholder. Using a similar approach to Knopf, Nam, and Thornton (2002), we 
measure this wealth incentive as the natural log of the sum of the delta of the 
managers‟ shares and options, i.e., the natural log of the pound change in managers‟ 
wealth as the share price changes by 1%. The log specification of the variables 
reflects the fact that as the share-based wealth of managers‟ increases, the incentive to 
alter share price increases but at a diminishing rate. Thus, this specification supports a 
concave utility function. We argue that due to liquidity issues, shares and options 
could provide different levels of risk aversion and we disentangle our measure of 
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wealth incentive into two distinct variables: the log of the delta of the shares and the 
log of the delta of the options. Options can also provide an incentive to increase risk 
since an option increases in value with volatility. As in Knopf, Nam, and Thornton 
(2002), we measure this incentive to increase risk as the natural log of the pound 
change in the managers‟ portfolio of options as volatility changes by 1%, i.e., vega. 
The large majority of the studies that analyze managerial compensation or managerial 
shares and option holdings concentrate on the CEO. We recognize that financial 
decisions could be made by other board members so instead of concentrating only on 
the CEO portfolio holdings, we consider the shares and option holdings of the team of 
executive directors. To our knowledge, only Main, Bruce, and Buck (1996), Aggarwal 
and Samwick (2003), and Coles, Daniel, and Naveen (2006) examine team incentives. 
 Knopf, Nam, and Thornton (2002) and Rogers (2002) measure vega and 
option deltas using the BSE. We argue that the BSE does not take into account the 
options‟ vesting period, the likelihood that the manager will leave and forfeit the 
options, and the managers‟ exercise policy. These omissions are likely to bias the 
proxies and the inference taken from using those proxies. We estimate our proxies for 
vegas and deltas of the current option holdings using the model proposed by Cvitanic,  
Wiener, and Zapatero (2008). This model allows us to consider the vesting period of 
the options, the likelihood that the manager could leave and forfeit the options, and 
the possibility that the manager could exercise the options before maturity. The delta 
of the shares is calculated using the methods in Knopf, Nam, and Thornton (2002) and 
Rogers (2002), i.e., the delta is the product of 1% of the share price at the annual 
report year-end and the number of shares held by the manager. 
Since managers are constrained on hedging the part of their wealth that is 
connected to company value, the literature suggests that as managers‟ wealth becomes 
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more linked to company value, managers will become more risk averse. Thus, we 
expect the log of the delta of shares and the log of the delta of options to be positively 
related with the companies hedging decision. Conversely, since vega measures the 
willingness to take risk, we expect to find a negative relation between vega and the 
hedging decision.     
 
4.2. Other hedging determinants - control variables 
 
In a setting where shareholders hold diversified portfolios, risk management 
can be affected by the structure of the corporate tax code, financial distress costs, 
underinvestment costs, and the managers‟ wealth and risk incentives (Smith and 
Stulz, 1985).
12
 Since hedging could increase company value in the presence of 
financial distress costs, we expect to find a positive relation between leverage and the 
likelihood that the company hedges. As a proxy for financial distress, we use 
leverage. In the presence of underinvestment costs, hedging can be value enhancing. 
Underinvestment costs are likely to be more pronounced in companies with high 
growth opportunities. As a proxy for growth opportunities, we use the market-to-book 
value ratio. We expect to find a positive relation between our proxy for growth 
opportunities and the likelihood that the company will hedge.  
The effect of size as a hedging determinant is not clear in the theoretical or 
empirical literature.
13
 Authors like Nance, Smith, and Smithson (1993), Geczy, 
                                                 
12
 We do not include tax as a determinant of corporate hedging. Many UK companies face a linear 
effective tax function, which implies that for UK firms the tax-based motive for hedging is possibly 
weak (Spano, 2007). Other UK studies on the determinants of corporate hedging that do include a tax 
variable consider a dummy variable based on tax-loss carry-forwards. However, this is more likely a 
measure of financial distress.  
13
 This literature argues that company size is a corporate hedging determinant although often arguing 
that the direction of the effect is ambiguous. Moreover, it is not clear how to interpret some of the 
results since the literature uses proxies for size, which depend on the size range of the selected sample. 
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Minton, and Schrand, (1997), and Rogers (2002) argue that due to economies of scale, 
larger companies are more likely to hedge. Other authors argue that since smaller 
companies are more likely to have information asymmetries and more costly external 
financing, smaller companies are more likely to benefit from hedging (Tufano, 1996). 
It could be argued that the larger companies in our sample would correspond to small 
companies in the samples of the hedging determinants of the literature, and in our 
sample the size hypothesis is difficult to verify. Nevertheless, we believe that the size 
spread in our sample does allow us to test the size hypothesis due to different levels of 
economies of scale and information asymmetry. We measure company size as the 
natural log of total assets, but we do not make a prediction on the relation between 
firm size and hedging likelihood. As hedging alternatives, companies can use 
conservative financial policies. Companies that distribute more of their earnings as 
dividends are more likely to be cash constrained. We use the dividend yield and the 
quick ratio as proxies for hedging alternatives. We expect to find a positive relation 
between dividend yield and the hedging likelihood and a negative relation between 
the quick ratio and the hedging likelihood. 
Vickery (2008) argues that industries in which output or cash flow co-vary 
positively with interest rates are less exposed to interest rate risk since this positive 
co-variance constitutes a natural hedge. The author finds that coal mining, petroleum 
refining, and oil and gas extraction industries show the highest correlation between 
interest rates and output or cash flow changes. To control for natural hedges, we 
include in our model a dummy variable, which takes the value of one if the company 
belongs to those industries. We expect to find a negative relation between our dummy 
variable and the hedging likelihood. 
                                                                                                                                            
In other words, the same company can be considered small or large depending on which sample it is 
included. This could explain the ambiguous results concerning the effect of size on corporate hedging.   
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  AIM companies could lack financial sophistication and adequate corporate 
governance structures. We hypothesise that non-executive directors will monitor 
managers‟ actions and that companies with better corporate governance structures will 
be more likely to adopt adequate risk management policies.
14
 AIM companies are not 
required to follow the Combined Code on Corporate Governance (required by UK 
companies listed in the Main Market). However, there is a set of guidelines published 
by the Quoted Companies Alliance (QCA), which is aimed at AIM companies. 
According to the QCA guidelines, a company should have at least two independent 
non-executive directors on its board of directors. We include in our model a dummy 
variable that takes the value of one if the board has less than two non-executive 
directors. We hypothesise that in companies in which the board has less than two non-
executives, managers are internally less monitored. Companies that are less monitored 
could be financially less astute and thus be less likely to use hedging techniques. This 
argument would result in a negative relation between our variable and the hedging 
likelihood. Conversely, companies that are less monitored could be more likely to 
adopt more conservative risk management decisions since they will be more exposed 
to managerial agency problems and thus hedge more. The latter would result in a 
positive relation between our variable and the hedging likelihood. Therefore, we do 
not make a prediction on the relation between our dummy variable and the hedging 
likelihood. 
The data for the control variables are obtained from Datastream or the annual 
reports of the sample companies. 
 
                                                 
14
 There are mixed findings on the impact of outside (non-executive) directors on the use of derivatives. 
Marsden and Prevost (2005) suggest only a passive role for outside directors on the use of derivatives, 
but Borokhovich, Brunarski, Crutchley, and Simkins (2004) find that outside directors have an 
influence in the decision of the companies to use of interest rate derivatives. 
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4.3. Determinants of managerial wealth and risk incentives 
 
Some of our control variables in the hedging likelihood model can affect 
managerial incentives. For example, we would expect managers of companies with 
higher leverage ratios to be monitored by their debtholders, (primarily in the case of 
AIM companies the major debtholders would be their banks). Thus, the more 
leveraged companies could be less likely to grant equity-like compensation to their 
managers. Companies are expected to optimally design compensation contracts to 
mitigate agency problems, thus managerial incentives are endogenous variables and 
treating these variables as exogenous can lead to spurious inference.   
Guay (1999) and Core and Guay (1999) study the determinants of the 
managers‟ portfolio deltas and vegas. We use some of their determinants, as well as 
some suggested by other studies. We also add some corporate governance variables to 
define our model of managerial wealth and risk incentives for our sample of AIM 
companies due to their specific governance structure. Larger companies are likely to 
pay more to their executives, and we expect to find a positive relation between delta 
and vega and firm size. Core and Guay (1999) argue that managers of riskier 
companies are likely to demand higher compensation levels. However, Aggarwal and 
Samwick (1999) show that managers‟ pay performance sensitivity can decrease with 
risk. Therefore, based on this mixed evidence, we make no prediction on the relation 
between companies‟ risk and delta and vega. Our proxy for risk is the natural log of 
the annualised standard deviation of daily share price returns of up to one year prior to 
the date of the hedging analysis.  
Companies with more growth opportunities are less easy to monitor so we 
expect that in those companies the compensation of managers will be more tied to the 
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companies‟ performance. We expect to find a positive relation between delta and vega 
and growth opportunities. Our proxy for growth opportunities is the market-to-book 
ratio.  
Cash compensation can be used as an indicator of managers‟ outside wealth 
and thus it can be a measure of risk aversion. Under this interpretation, a manager that 
is paid more cash is less risk averse and needs to be less monitored. Therefore, we 
expect a negative relation between cash and vega and delta. On the other hand, higher 
levels of cash compensation can reflect higher pay packages. As a result, the relation 
between cash compensation and vega and delta could be positive. As a proxy for cash 
compensation, we use the natural log of the salary, benefits, and bonus paid to 
managers.  
John and John (1993) show that as leverage increases, pay performance 
sensitivity decreases. Thus, more leveraged companies are less likely to use options 
and shares to pay to its executives. We expect to find a negative relation between 
gearing and delta and vega.  
Following Guay (1999) and Rajgopal and Shevlin (2002), we recognize that 
managers‟ wealth convexity and concavity (vega and delta) are related. Since vega 
measures managers‟ incentive to increase risk, it can be argued that such an incentive 
has to be constrained to value-enhancing projects (a manager could increase risk by 
investing in negative NPV projects). This incentive is provided by delta. Thus, delta 
should be a determinant of vega. On the other hand, since the incentive to take value-
enhancing projects (delta) could lead the manager to consider altering the company‟s 
risk and since the incentive to alter the company‟s risk is measured by vega, vega 
should be a determinant of delta (for example, Coles, Daniel, and Naveen, 2006 use 
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vega as a determinant of delta).
 
As the same underlying variables drive the values of 
both vega and delta, we expect to find a positive coefficient between vega and delta.  
Yermack (1995) suggests that companies can grant shares and options to 
reward management for good performance. As a proxy for past performance, we use 
the average monthly share price return over the two years prior to the annual report 
end date.  
Utility, banking, and insurance industries are more regulated and thus more 
monitored. In these industries it can be less necessary to link managers‟ wealth to 
performance. We use a dummy indicator that takes the value of one if the company 
belongs to one of these industries, and we expect to find a negative relation between 
our variable and delta and vega. 
The quality of governance can also have an impact on compensation policies 
and on managerial shares and option holdings. Moreover, we would expect that 
managers of companies with poorer governance structures extract greater 
compensation (Core and Guay, 1999; Hanlon, Rajgopal, and Shevlin, 2003). We use 
two proxies for good corporate governance: the percentage of non-executive directors 
on the board and a dummy variable that takes the value of one if there are less than 
two non-executive directors on the board. Since poor governance can lead to rent 
extraction, we expect to find a positive relation between our dummy variable and vega 
and delta, and a negative relation between the percentage of non-executive directors 
and both vega and delta. The QCA guidelines for corporate governance for AIM 
companies advise that companies should have a separate remuneration board and that 
only non-executive directors should be on this board. We hypothesise that companies 
with separate remuneration boards are more likely to design compensation contracts 
that better align the interests of managers and shareholders. We create a dummy 
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variable that takes the value of one if the company does not have a remuneration 
committee (or if it does not disclose in its annual report the existence of such a 
committee) or if executive directors sit on the remuneration committee. We expect to 
find a negative relation between our dummy variable and vega and delta. Lastly, since 
companies can have different numbers of executive directors and we are measuring 
managerial incentives as the total of the managerial incentives of the executive team, 
we include in our regression the number of executive directors as an independent 
variable. 
The data for the managerial wealth and risk incentives variables are obtained 
from Datastream or the annual reports of the sample companies. 
 
5. Data description and results  
 
5.1. Data description 
 
We randomly select 446 companies listed on the AIM market and collect their 2006 
annual report.
15
 We search in the annual report for information related to each 
company‟s exposure to currency, interest rate risk, and its hedging practices. If the 
company stated in the annual report that it is exposed to currency or interest rate 
movement, or if the company has debt/investments or exports/imports in a foreign 
currency, we consider that it is exposed to interest rate or currency risk. Otherwise, 
we exclude the company from the sample. Earlier studies are criticized for not having 
                                                 
15
 We chose 2006 as the year of our analysis since new accounting rules governing the accounting and 
disclosure of risk management were introduced in the UK for listed companies for the year-end 2006. 
The new accounting rules aimed to align the text of UK accounting standards with that of International 
Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS). The previous accounting standard FRS 13 was withdrawn 
following the implementation of FRS 25 (IAS 32) „Financial Instruments: Disclosure and Presentation‟ 
and FRS 26 (IAS 39) „Financial Instruments: Measurement‟.  
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these selection criteria because companies that had little or no currency or interest rate 
risk were classified as non-hedgers. Graham and Rogers (2002) and Rogers (2002) are 
exceptions to this criticism. Additionally, we exclude a company from the sample if 
the company does not clearly disclose the information concerning executive directors‟ 
ownership of shares and options, the options‟ details, or if the company‟s share price 
data are not available. This selection criterion results in a final sample of 317 
companies (of which 250 indicate they are exposed to currency risk and all companies 
in our sample have interest rate risk).  
Table 1 presents a comparison of the means of hedgers and non-hedgers. It 
shows that hedgers are the larger of the AIM companies and have a higher probability 
of financial distress.
 
Executive directors of companies that hedge own a significantly 
smaller share of the company, and the incentive to alter share price provided by the 
shareholdings of the executive team is significantly higher for non-hedgers. This 
result is also true for the wealth incentive provided by share options. Nevertheless, the 
difference between the two groups is not statistically significant.  Vega is larger in the 
hedger group although again the difference is not statistically significant. This effect 
is not driven by the number of options held by the executive team since executive 
teams of the non-hedger companies hold significantly more options than executive 
teams of companies which hedge (these results are not reported in Table 1). A 
possible explanation is that the options held by executive teams of the non-hedger 
group are well in the money, but the options held by the executive team of the hedger 
group are in the “at the money” region. Thus, although the executive team of the 
hedger group holds fewer options, those options provide a larger incentive to increase 
the company‟s risk. 
 
 25 
Insert Table 1 
 
In 94% of the companies in our sample the executive team holds shares of the 
company, and in 81% of the companies the executive team holds options (showing the 
importance of considering options when defining proxies for managerial incentives). 
To value the executive options using the model suggested by Cvitanic, Wiener, and 
Zapatero (2008), we need the following information concerning the options: the 
exercise price, the vesting period, the time to maturity, the share price at the date of 
the annual report, the risk-free rate, volatility,
16
 the executive options‟ exercise policy, 
and the executive exit rate. The exit rate represents the likelihood that the director will 
leave the company before the option matures and thus possibly either forfeit the 
unvested options or immediately exercise the vested options. As a measure for the exit 
rate, we use 7.71%, the rate of UK CEO turnover post publication of the Cadbury 
report (reported in Dahya, McConnell, and Travlos, 2002). In Cvitanic, Wiener, and 
Zapatero (2008), the executive director exercises the options if the share price hits a 
certain multiple of the exercise price or at maturity.
17
 We use the exercise multiple 
reported in Carpenter (1998) and assume that when the share price is 2.75 times 
higher than the exercise price, the executive will exercise their options.
18
 The exercise 
price, vesting period, and time to maturity are from the annual report. Daily share 
prices and dividend yields are from Datastream. As a proxy for the risk-free rate, we 
                                                 
16
 Our proxy for volatility is the standard deviation of share price returns of up to one year prior to the 
annual report end date. 
17
 The intuition for this result is that when options are deeply in the money, the executive will exercise 
them to avoid the risk of it falling out of the money. Also, this feature of the model allows for the fact 
that most executives tend to exercise their options long before maturity (Hudart and Lang, 1996; 
Carpenter, 2002). 
18
 Ideally, we should calculate this exercise multiple for each company with historic data on the 
options‟ exercise policies of the executives. Unfortunately, for this and related papers this data is not 
available. 
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use the yield to maturity of UK treasury STRIPS with the same (or approximately the 
same) time to maturity as the options being valued.  
In Table 2, we present some descriptive statistics of the ownership and cash 
compensation variables for the executive directors in our sample.
19
 It shows that on 
average the executive board holds 17.57% of the shares of the company although 
there is, nevertheless, a large spread between the first and last quartiles. The average 
wealth incentive (provided by shares) to increase the share price by 1% (delta of 
shares) is £81,461. The incentive provided by options to increase the share price by 
1% (options‟ delta) is much smaller, with an average value of £10,583. For their 
sample of US companies, Coles, Daniel, and Naveen (2006) report values of the sum 
of deltas of shares and options of teams of executives of $1,387,000, which is 
substantially larger than the values in the table (based on average 2006 exchange 
rate).
20
 The average incentive to increase volatility by 1% is £2,149, which again is 
considerably smaller than the figure reported by Coles, Daniel, and Naveen (2006) of 
$202,000. For comparison purposes, in Table 2 we also report the value of the call 
options held by the executive team, the delta and the vega calculated using the BSE 
(respectively BSE, DeltaBSE, and VegaBSE). The average figures, obtained using the 
BSE model, are larger than the figures obtained using the Cvitanic, Wiener, and 
Zapatero (2008) model. This result seems to indicate that by using the BSE model to 
calculate the proxies for risk and wealth incentives, the literature could have been 
                                                 
19
 Some of the companies only disclose the total cash compensation paid to the board. Since we are 
only interested in the pay to executive directors, in those cases we adjust the total to the executives by 
dividing the total paid to directors by the number of directors in the board and then multiplying the 
figure by the number of executive directors. We are aware that we could be understating the cash 
compensation paid to the executives since non-executive directors are likely to be paid less.  
20
 In Coles, Daniel, and Naveen (2006), the figure of the delta of team compensation is the sum of the 
delta of the top four executives and the CEO. Since our figure includes all the executive directors 
(which can result in a team larger or smaller than four), the comparison of two figures has to be treated 
with caution.  We would like to investigate if the large difference in the figures is driven by the delta of 
shares, the delta of options, or both. Unfortunately, such a comparison cannot be established since 
Coles, Daniel, and Naveen (2006) only report the sum of the deltas of shares and options. 
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overstating the values of those proxies. Lastly, in 2006, the average sum of salary, 
benefits, and bonus of the executive teams was £368,211. Coles, Daniel, and Naveen 
(2006) report a figure of $3,678,000, which again shows a large discrepancy between 
both samples. The large difference between our figures for both managerial equity 
wealth and cash compensation and the results reported in Coles, Daniel, and Naveen 
(2006), for example, can be explained by the size of the companies in our sample. We 
would expect that larger companies, like those analyzed in Coles, Daniel, and Naveen 
(2006), would have larger compensation packages. Although this disparity is 
expected, the differences in value between US and UK compensation packages are 
not new to the literature (see Conyon and Murphy, 2000).  
 
Insert Table 2 
 
 
5.2. Regression results: Incentive variables as exogenous variables 
 
The relation between hedging and managerial wealth and risk incentives was 
tested using a logit regression. The independent variables are a set of control variables 
and the managerial wealth and risk incentives. The managerial incentives are defined 
as the sum of the managerial incentives of the executives‟ team.21 In the second 
column of Table 3 (Model 1), we present our results using in this model specification 
the log of the sum of the deltas of shares and options.  
 
                                                 
21
 This approach assumes that the number of executives is constant across the different companies. As a 
robustness test, we repeat all the calculations, adjusting the risk incentive variables to the number of 
executives on the board. The qualitative results do not change when we do this adjustment, and we only 
report the results obtained using the executive team incentives measures. 
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Insert Table 3 
 
Our results support the hypothesis that larger companies are more likely to 
hedge. This finding could be due to the economies of scale hypothesis, as suggested 
by previous literature, or due to the fact that the smaller companies in the AIM market 
could be financially less sophisticated and less likely to hedge. Also, the results 
support the hypothesis that companies which are more cash constrained are more 
likely to hedge. The results for managerial incentives are opposite to what we should 
expect. The log of the sum of the delta of shares and options is negative, and the log 
of the vega of options is positive; both variables are statistically significant. As a 
robustness test, we estimate Model 1 and Model 2 specifications with the unlogged 
version of the incentive variables, and the results are qualitatively the same.
 
This 
result could occur since under Model 1 specification, the coefficient of the log of the 
vega variable can be giving us information about the overall incentive provided by 
options and not necessarily the risk incentive provided by options.  This finding can 
be a result of the log specification of the incentive variables, meaning that as the 
share-based wealth of the executives increases, the incentive variables will also 
increase but at a diminishing rate. Since the executives‟ share-based wealth is 
dominated by shareholdings, the wealth effect incentive provided by options is 
potentially not being captured by our proxy. Moreover, options and shares can 
provide different incentives since an option reflects the right to ownership, but not 
ownership. Although this result is partially reflected in the delta (the delta of a share is 
one and an option will (commonly) have a delta smaller than one), an option always 
has the probability of finishing out of the money. Thus, it is likely that the incentives 
provided by shares and options are viewed differently by managers. Also, contrary to 
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shareholdings, executive options cannot be traded and, therefore, shares are more 
liquid from the executive‟s point of view. To capture, the (possible) different 
incentives provided by options and shares, we separate our variable (log of the sum of 
the deltas of shares and options) into two variables: the log of the delta of shares and 
the log of the delta of options (Model 2). 
The results in Table 3 (Model 2) show that shares and options provide different 
incentives. We can see that, as suggested in Guay (1999), options provide two 
incentives: they induce risk aversion (as measured by the option‟s delta which is 
significant) and they also induce risk taking (as measured by options‟ vega, which is 
not significant). As a robustness test, we estimate Model 1 and Model 2 using the 
BSE to calculate the delta and vega of options. The results are qualitatively the same 
for all variables, but the wealth incentive provided by options (the options‟ delta 
coefficient) is positive but not significant if we use the BSE. This result shows the 
importance of using an options pricing model that adequately considers the 
specificities of executive options. It could be argued that our result is conditional on 
our assumption of the exercise multiple. Estimating the options‟ wealth and risk 
incentives using the BSE indirectly provides a (weak) robustness test of our results on 
the assumption that the executive will exercise the options when the share price is 
2.75 times the exercise price (or alternatively at maturity or if the executive leaves 
holding vested options, if the option is in the money). In the case that the exercise 
multiple is very large (infinity in the limit), the executive will only exercise the option 
at maturity and we can use the classic BSE.
22
 As a further robustness test, we run 
Models 1 and 2 but with the wealth and risk incentives provided by options estimated 
using a low exercise multiple. Since executives can exercise their options as soon as 
                                                 
22
 To be precise, this is only true for the exercise policy since the vesting period and the likelihood that 
the executive will leave or be fired before the options mature is still considered in the Cvitanic, Wiener, 
and Zapatero (2008) model (and not in the BSE model). 
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they vest, we calculate the wealth and risk incentives if executives exercise their 
options as soon as they are in the money.
23
 Our results are again qualitatively the 
same. Further, to test the robustness of our results to our assumption of the rate of 
executive turnover, we re-estimate vega and delta using 4.3%, which is the forced UK 
CEO turnover rate post publication of the Cadbury report (reported in Dahya, 
McConnell, and Travlos, 2002), and we re-run our regression models. Our results 
remain unchanged (these results are available from the authors). 
We find that the delta of shares has a (significant) negative coefficient. This 
result indicates that companies in which the executive directors‟ wealth, as measured 
by the delta of shares, is more linked to companies‟ value are less likely to hedge. 
This finding contradicts the predictions of Smith and Stulz (1985). A possible 
explanation for our result is that management teams of smaller companies can have 
different risk attitudes and perceptions than larger firms. This attitude to risk could 
influence their choices in hedging (Pennings and Smidts, 2000). Also, corporate 
decisions in smaller companies are not made in separate functions but by managers 
who are responsible for multiple functions (Pennings and Garcia, 2004). Thus, smaller 
companies might have more autonomous management teams in which executives 
have to fully understand the different aspects of the business and the consequences of 
their corporate actions. Another possible explanation is that smaller companies could 
have better internal monitoring mechanisms or can be easier to monitor. Both 
explanations, if true, would result in mitigated agency conflicts due to managerial risk 
aversion. Moreover, since in smaller companies managers are often significant owners 
who founded the company and have entrepreneurial characteristics (and can be less 
risk averse), we would expect that the wealth incentives of management teams of 
                                                 
23
 We assume here that the executives exercise vested options when the share price hits the exercise 
price plus 0.0001pence. 
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smaller companies result in stronger risk-taking incentives than the wealth and risk 
incentives of larger companies.  
Some of the larger companies in the AIM could be similar to some of the 
smaller companies examined in prior research in the UK and US. We decide to further 
explore our sample and test if there is a significant difference between the effect of 
managerial incentives in the smaller and larger companies in the AIM market. For this 
test, we consider two additional specifications of our model. In Model 3, we interact 
the managerial incentives with a dummy variable that takes the value of one if the 
company has a turnover smaller than £5.6 million. In Model 4, we interact our 
incentive measures with a dummy variable that has the value of one if the company 
has a market capitalization less than £50 million.
24
 Our hypothesis is that in smaller 
companies, the incentives provided to the executives team, by shares and options, is 
significantly different from the incentives provided in larger companies in the AIM 
market. Table 4 shows that in the smaller companies there is a stronger negative 
relation between the incentive provided by shares and options and the hedging 
likelihood. Nevertheless, the interaction coefficients are not significant. Thus, we 
cannot conclude that the effect on the hedging likelihood of the incentives provided 
by shares and options of the executive teams of the smaller companies is significantly 
different from the effect of the incentive provided to the executive teams of the larger 
companies in the AIM market. Our result for the incentive provided by options is 
nevertheless sensitive to our definition of dummy variables. As a robustness test of 
the results of Model 3, we re-estimate the model using a more stringent definition of 
the size dummy variable (D_small). A company is defined as small, according to 
section 382 of the UK companies‟ Act 2006, if it satisfies two of the three following 
                                                 
24
 The £50 million cut-off point is chosen since the large majority of companies traded in the Main 
Market have a larger market capitalization. See footnote 9 for details. 
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requirements: turnover of no more than £5.6million, total assets of no more than 
£2.8million, and not more than fifty employees. Therefore, we redefine the dummy 
variable of Model 3 (D_small).  The dummy (D_small) now takes the value of one if 
the company had a turnover less than £5.6 million and its total assets are less than 
£2.8million. As in Model 3, the interaction coefficient shows that the wealth effect, 
provided by shareholdings, of small companies is not statistically different from the 
wealth effect provided to managers of larger companies (these results are available 
from the authors). The interaction coefficients of wealth and risk incentives, provided 
by options, are now statistically significant (the coefficient of the interaction variable 
with the options‟ wealth incentive is negative, and the interaction effect of the risk 
incentive positive). As a robustness test of Model 4, we redefine our small 
capitalization dummy variable (D_SmallCap). In 2006, the majority of the companies 
traded on the AIM had a market capitalization less than £25million. Thus, we redefine 
our dummy variable (D_SmallCap) as taking the value of one if the company has a 
market capitalization inferior to £25million. Qualitatively our results do not change. 
 
 Insert Table 4 
 
5.3. Do executive teams that hold large proportions of shares behave more like 
owners? 
 
The managerial compensation literature suggests that since options increase 
with volatility, option holdings can provide an incentive to increase risk.
25
 On the 
other hand, since both options and shareholdings link managers‟ wealth to company 
                                                 
25
 Using a certainty-equivalence framework, Lambert, Larcker, and Verrecchia (1991) and Hall and 
Murphy (2002) show that in the money options can increase managerial risk aversion. 
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value and increase managers‟ sensitivity to changes in share prices (delta), options 
and shares could provide an incentive to decrease company risk. In other words, since 
options link the manager‟s wealth to company value, the manager could become more 
risk averse. Less developed in the managerial compensation literature is the idea that 
since delta increases with share value, the value of the managerial portfolio of options 
and shares increases if the manager‟s actions are value enhancing, i.e., delta can also 
provide an incentive to hedge less, if hedging is value enhancing (exceptions include 
Ross, 2004; Low, 2009). Ross (2004) shows that the effect of compensation contracts 
on managerial risk attitudes is not only dependent on the shape of the payoff function 
of the compensation contract (concave or convex). A convex (concave) payoff 
function will not necessarily result in a convex (concave) effect on the manager‟s 
utility function. The effect of the payoff function depends on its functional shape but 
also on the level of wealth of the manager, the manager‟s risk aversion coefficient, 
and whether the manager has an increasing or decreasing risk aversion utility 
function. Managerial ownership of shares can result in risk-taking behavior, and 
conversely, managerial ownership of options can result in risk aversion behavior. 
Ultimately, the incentive provided by delta will depend on which of the two effects 
(risk aversion or value enhancing incentive) dominates. We would expect that in 
companies where the separation between ownership and control is less pronounced, 
the value enhancing incentive would dominate. Thus, managers who own a large 
proportion of the shares of the company can be less risk averse and hedge less. As 
stated in section 3, many AIM companies are closely held, with managers often being 
a majority shareholder. It is possible that agency conflicts arising from the separation 
of the role of manager/shareholder are less likely to occur in some of these 
companies. If this hypothesis is correct, then in companies where managers are large 
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shareholders, we should not find evidence of agency conflicts due to managerial risk 
aversion. It is also possible that managers who own a large proportion of the company 
are overconfident or more risk tolerant since they could feel more responsible for the 
company and have more confidence in the future prospects (Malmendier and Tate, 
2005 and Lewellen, 2006 present evidence of manager overconfidence). 
 We test the alternative hypothesis that executive teams that hold 5% or less of 
the shares of the company
26
 are more risk averse, and the hedging likelihood of such 
teams is larger than the hedging likelihood of executive teams that hold larger 
proportions of company shares.
27
 To test this hypothesis, we interact a dummy 
variable that takes the value of one if the directors hold 5% or less of the shares 
outstanding (D_5) with our managerial incentive variables. We expect to find a 
positive relation between our interaction variable and the likelihood that the company 
will hedge. 
Table 5 shows that the wealth incentives provided by shares have a different 
effect in the hedging likelihood if the executive team holds a small proportion of the 
shares of the company. Moreover, the results show that in companies where the 
executive team holds less than 5% of the shares outstanding, managers are more risk 
averse. This wealth incentive can happen due to overconfidence of managers that hold 
a large proportion of the shares of the company or because in those companies the 
separation of the roles manager/shareholder is less pronounced. There is no significant 
difference in the effect on the hedging likelihood of the incentives provided by 
options.  
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 Morck, et al. (1988) use a cutoff point of 5% ownership. As a robustness test, we repeat our 
calculation for a cutoff point of 10%, which is slightly higher than the median of our sample (9.89%). 
The results remain qualitatively the same. 
27
 Although we should expect that as the percentage of share ownership of the executive increases so 
does the delta of their shares, delta is not a function of the number of shares outstanding. For example, 
the executive team of company A can have a larger percentage of the company, when compared to 
company B, and a smaller delta.  
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 Insert Table 5 
 
 
5.4. Regression results: Incentive variables as endogenous variables 
 
We recognize that some of our control variables could affect the directors‟ 
incentives, and therefore, managerial holdings incentives are endogenous variables. 
To control for endogeneity, we first estimate three tobit regression models (since 
some of the executive teams do not hold options or shares) for the managerial 
incentives variables. We use the predicted value from these models as explanatory 
variables of the risk management model in a two-stage least squares framework (our 
method is similar to Rogers, 2002). The results of the tobit models are presented in 
Table 6. Our results do not support the hypothesis that options held by executive 
teams of larger companies provide larger incentives to alter company risk or share 
value. Moreover, shares held by executive teams of smaller companies provide larger 
incentives to alter share price. Shares held by executive teams of companies with 
higher growth opportunities provide larger incentives to alter share value.
28
 We find a 
significant positive relation between cash compensation and the managerial incentive 
provided by shares, which according to our hypothesis would indicate that managers 
whose wealth is more linked to company value are paid more. Since the large 
majority of the companies in our sample do not grant shares, this result is not 
necessarily an indication of larger pay packages. This finding could indicate that 
managers who have more wealth connected to company value actively decide on their 
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 The coefficient of the market-to-book value variable is significant only at weak levels. 
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pay. For companies in which the board has less than two non-executive directors, 
managers have smaller incentives to alter share price. Therefore, we find no evidence 
of the rent extraction hypothesis due to poorer governance structures. In those 
companies, managers have a higher incentive to alter the company‟s risk. The 
previous two-year share price returns have a positive coefficient for deltas and a 
negative coefficient for vega. The positive coefficient could indicate that, as 
suggested by Yermack (1995), shares and options can be granted to reward past 
performance. However, the large majority of the companies in our sample do not 
grant shares, thus, although the Yermack (1995) hypothesis can be valid for options, it 
is less likely to apply to shares. Nevertheless, some of the shares held by managers 
can result from the exercise of options. It is also possible that the coefficients explain 
the mechanical relation between share prices and deltas and vegas (Rogers, 2002). As 
share prices increase, deltas will increase and vega will decrease (since the share price 
is moving away from the exercise price). This relation can explain the negative 
coefficient in Model 8. Lastly, as expected, vega and delta of options are positively 
related. 
 
Insert Table 6 
 
Assuming that companies optimally design compensation contracts to mitigate 
agency problems and that the coefficients of the three tobit models in Table 6 
represent the permanent effect on vega and delta, we use those coefficients to estimate 
the predicted values of vega and delta. We then use those predicted values as 
instruments of the logit regression model. In Table 7, Model 9 shows that treating the 
incentive variables as endogenous produces a significant difference in the results. The 
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wealth and risk incentives held by the executive teams do not seem to affect the 
hedging likelihood. In Model 10, we interact our D_5 dummy variable with the 
managerial incentives and find that in companies where the executive teams hold a 
large proportion of the companies‟ shares, managerial effects do not impact the 
hedging likelihood. Conversely, executive teams that hold a smaller proportion of the 
companies‟ shares are significantly more risk averse and more likely to hedge. 
 
Insert Table 7 
 
5.5. Robustness test 
 
Overwhelmingly, the risk management literature identifies hedgers as users of 
derivatives. As a robustness test, we redefine our dependent variable as it is 
commonly used in the literature (derivative users), and we re-estimate Models 4, 5, 
and 10 in Models 11, 12, and 13 with the new dependent variable. Table 8 shows that 
70 companies hedge with derivatives compared to 95 in the previous tests. The results 
for size and hedging alternatives are qualitatively the same. The coefficient of the 
wealth incentive provided by shares is not significant in the Model 11 specification. 
This result could indicate that due to this misclassification, the prior empirical 
literature could have misinterpreted the effect of managerial incentives on the hedging 
likelihood. Nevertheless, as the literature normally concentrates on large and widely 
held companies, we would expect that larger companies would use more derivatives,
29
 
and the difference in the definition of the hedgers‟ classification should be less 
important in the previous studies. Lastly, Models 12 and 13 confirm our previous 
                                                 
29
 On the other hand, many of the earlier studies considered periods when hedging was less prevalent, 
especially using derivatives.  
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results (at the 10% significance  level), which indicate that the wealth incentive 
provided by the shares held by executive teams that hold a small proportion of the 
company has a significantly different effect on the hedging likelihood.  
 
Insert Table 8 
 
6. Conclusion 
 
In this paper, we estimate managerial incentives and the hedging decision of 
UK AIM companies. In the model of managerial incentives, we consider a variety of 
important characteristics of executive options, including the vesting period, the 
probability that the executive leaves the company before the options mature or vest, 
and the possibility that the options are exercised before maturity. Our results show 
that the model used does impact the observed effect of managerial incentives on the 
hedging likelihood. This result is an indication that the BSE model may not be an 
adequate model to approximate the value of the incentives provided by executive 
options. Also, contrary to previous literature, we do not concentrate on large and 
widely held companies since we study the effect on the hedging likelihood of 
managerial wealth and risk incentives of small and closely held companies. Small, 
closely held companies where managers hold a large proportion of the company are 
more likely to be close to the zero agency-cost case of Jensen and Meckling (1976). 
Therefore, in these companies, managerial portfolio holdings could provide 
considerably different incentives than those previously observed in the literature.   
We propose that in small, closely held companies where managers own a large 
proportion of the company, not only the scale of managers‟ incentives is important but 
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also the level of ownership (percentage of ownership). Managers that are majority 
shareholders are likely to be more committed and devote more effort to the company 
even if the incentive amount resulting from their holdings is smaller. They are also 
more likely to have entrepreneurial characteristics and be less risk averse.  Both the 
scale of managers‟ incentives and their level of ownership should be considered when 
analysing the effect of the managers‟ portfolio holdings on managers‟ risk-taking 
financial decisions. Our results support our hypothesis. In companies where managers 
own a large proportion of the shares of the company, the wealth effect of managerial 
shareholdings results in a risk-taking effect and this result is consistent throughout 
several robustness tests. We find that managers who hold a smaller proportion of the 
company (although they can hold significant amounts of equity) are significantly 
more risk averse. Thus, the size and ownership structure characteristics of AIM 
companies seem to result in similarities between managers‟ and owners‟ actions. 
Future research should analyze if our results are characteristic to our sample, and if in 
samples where managers exercise their options much closer to maturity (e.g., the 
share price hits the “desired” level defined by the executive much later) the same 
result is observed. 
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Table 1  
Comparison of means between hedgers and non-hedgers of 317 companies listed on 
the UK AIM market. 
 
This table provides a comparison of the means of financial variables between hedgers 
and non-hedgers of 317 companies listed on the UK AIM market. Information is year-
end data from Datastream and the companies‟ annual reports. 
 
Definition of Variables: 
Percentage distributed dividends is the percentage of companies that distributed 
dividends in 2006. Percentage of foreign companies is the percentage of foreign 
companies within the group. Market-to-book value is the ratio of market value of 
equity to book value of equity at year-end. Total sales is the year-end total sales. 
Market value is the market capitalization of the company at the year-end 2006. 
Gearing is the ratio of book value of debt to market value of equity. Share ownership 
is the percentage of share ownership of executive directors. The total assets measure 
is the total assets reported. Quick ratio is the average ratio of current assets to current 
liabilities. Delta of shares is the average of the change in the executive directors‟ 
portfolio of shares as the share value changes by 1%. Delta of options is the average 
of the change in the value of the executive directors‟ portfolio of options as the share 
price changes by 1%. Vega is the average of the change in the value of the executive 
directors‟ portfolio as volatility changes by 1%.  
 
Percentage distributed dividends, percentage of foreign companies, and total sales 
appear in the table to provide information on the sample, but they are not used in the 
regression models. 
 
 
 
 Non-Hedger Hedger Probability 
Number of companies 222 95  
Percentage distributed dividends 18.02% 36.84%  
Percentage of foreign companies 5.41% 8.42%  
Market-to-book value  1 3 0.21 
Total sales (thousands of pounds) 37,088 46,315 0.34 
Market value (thousands of pounds) 38,906 77,842 0.13 
Gearing 19.90% 56.26% 0.00 
Share ownership 20.37% 11.02% 0.00 
Total assets (thousands of pounds) 37,288 65,359 0.01 
Quick ratio 10 7 0.20 
Delta shares (thousands of pounds) 97 45 0.05 
Delta options (thousands of pounds) 11 8 0.15 
Vega (thousands of pounds) 2.0 2.4 0.25 
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Table 2 
Descriptive statistics of compensation, ownership variables, and directors‟ board 
composition. 
 
This table provides control and managerial wealth and risk incentive variables in 317 
AIM companies from 2006 Annual Reports. Information is year-end data from 
Datastream or the companies‟  annual reports. 
 
 
Definition of Variables: Share ownership is the percentage of share ownership of 
executive directors. Delta shares (£) is the change in the executive directors‟ portfolio 
of shares as the share value changes by 1%. Call (£) is the value of the options held by 
executive directors. Delta options (£) is the change in the value of the executive 
directors‟ portfolio of options as the share price changes by 1%. Vega (£) is the 
change in the value of the executive directors‟ portfolio of options as volatility 
changes by 1%. BSE (£) is the value of the Black and Scholes options pricing 
formula. DeltaBSE (£) is the change in the value of the executive directors‟ portfolio 
of options as the share price changes by one percent, calculated using the Black and 
Scholes model. VegaBSE (£) is the change in the value of the executive directors‟ 
portfolio of options as volatility changes by one percent, calculated using the BSE. 
No. of executives is the number of executive directors on the board. No. of non-
executives is the number of non-executive directors on the board. Executive cash (£) 
is the sum of salary, benefits, and bonus paid to the executive directors during the 
year. 
 
 Mean Q1 Median Q3 Max Standard 
deviation 
Share ownership 17.57% 1.36% 9.89% 28.06% 94.53% 20.39% 
Delta shares (£) 81,461 2,097 13,974 59,231 6,358,554 380,266 
Call (£) 822,918 6,647 118,363 540,114 39,266,322 2,938,293 
Delta options(£) 10,583 112 1,983 7,854 400,797 31,577 
Vega (£) 2,149 0 587 2,094 28,057 4,372 
BSE (£) 936,447 10,361 141,701 610,054 46,361,555 3,330,682 
DeltaBSE (£) 11,711 151 2,304 9,102 469,882 35,139 
VegaBSE (£) 3,389 47 1,137 3,274 41,205 6,180 
No. of executives 3 2 3 4 7 1 
No.  of non-executives 3 2 3 3 7 1 
Executive cash (£) 368,211 137,911 279,682  470,955 3,883,739 389,107 
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Table 3 
Effect of managerial incentives on hedging likelihood.  
 
This table reports the results of the logit regression on the relation between hedging 
and managerial wealth and risk incentives. The dependent variable is an indicator 
variable, which takes the value of one if the firm hedges. Information is year-end data 
from Datastream or the companies‟ annual reports. 
 
In Model 1, the managerial incentives are measured as the log of vega and the log of 
the sum of the delta of shares and options held by the executive team. In Model 2, we 
disentangle the log of the delta of shares and delta of options into two separate 
variables: the log of the shares and the log of the options held by the executive team.   
 
Definition of Variables: Log (total assets) is the natural log of total assets. Market-to-
book value is the ratio of market value of equity to book value of equity. Gearing is 
the ratio of book value of debt to market value of equity. Dummy-industry is a 
dummy variable which takes the value of one if the company belongs to one of the 
following industries: coal mining, petroleum refining, oil and gas extraction. Dividend 
yield is the companies‟ year-end dividend yield. Quick ratio is ratio of current assets 
to current liabilities. Dummy if less than 2 non-executives is a dummy variable, which 
takes the value of one if the company has less than two non-executive directors in the 
board. Log (delta share+delta options) is the natural log of the change in the executive 
directors‟ portfolio of both shares and options as the share value changes by 1%. 
Log(delta shares) is the natural log of the change in the value of the executive 
directors‟ portfolio of shares as the share price changes by 1%. Log(delta options) is 
the natural log of change in the value of the executive directors‟ portfolio of options 
as the share price changes by 1%. Log(vega) is the natural log of the change in the 
value of the executive directors‟ portfolio of options as volatility changes by 1%. 
Model 1 Model 2 
Variable Coefficient p-value Coefficient p-value 
Intercept -7.533 0.0000 -6.919 0.0001 
Log (total assets) 0.417 0.0001 0.352 0.0004 
Market-to-book value  0.009 0.3937 0.01 0.3782 
Gearing 0.4745 0.1936 0.593 0.1353 
Dummy-industry 0.365 0.5633 0.278 0.6375 
Dividend yield 0.275 0.0054 0.336 0.0014 
Quick ratio -0.002 0.8066 0.0005 0.9254 
Dummy if less than 2 non-
executives 0.038 0.9225 0.131 0.7335 
Log (delta shares  + delta options) -0.189 0.0125   
Log (delta shares)   -0.166 0.0018 
Log (delta options)   0.142 0.0232 
Log (vega) 0.094 0.0273 -0.017 0.7499 
     
Total observations 317  317  
Hedgers 95  95  
Non-hedgers 222  222  
McFadden R-square 14.3%  15.8%  
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Table 4  
Models of differences in the effects of managerial incentives in small and large AIM 
companies.  
 
This table reports the results of the logit regression on the relation between hedging and 
managerial wealth and risk incentives including a proxy for small and large AIM companies. 
The dependent variable is an indicator variable that takes the value of one if the firm hedges.  
In Model 3, we interact the incentive variables with a dummy variable, which takes the value 
of one if the company‟s 2006 turnover is less than £5.6 million. In Model 4, we interact the 
incentive variables with a dummy variable, which takes the value of one if the company‟s 
market capitalization is less than £50 million.  
 
Definition of Variables: Log (total assets) is the natural log of total assets. Market-to-book 
value is the ratio of market value of equity to book value of equity. Gearing is the ratio of 
book value of debt to market value of equity. Dummy industry is a dummy variable, which 
takes the value of one if the company belongs to one of the following industries: coal mining, 
petroleum refining, oil and gas extraction. Dividend yield is the companies‟ year-end 
dividend yield. Quick ratio is ratio of current assets to current liabilities. Dummy if less than 2 
non-executives is a dummy variable, which takes the value of one if the company has less 
than two non-executive directors in the board. Log(delta shares) is the natural log of change 
in the value of the executive directors‟ portfolio of shares as the share price changes by 1%.  
Log(delta options) is the natural log of change in the value of the executive directors‟ 
portfolio of options as the share price changes by 1%. Log(vega) is the natural log of the 
change in the value of the executive directors‟ portfolio of options as volatility changes by 
1%. D_small is a dummy variable, which takes the value of one if the company had in 2006 a 
turnover inferior to £5.6 million. D_small_cap is a dummy variable, which takes the value of 
one if at the annual report year-end the market capitalization of the company is inferior to £25 
million.  
Model 3 Model 4 
Variable Coefficient p-value Coefficient p-value 
Intercept -6.485 0.0003 -6.338 0.0006 
Log (total assets) 0.326 0.0016 0.319 0.0030 
Market-to-book value 0.009 0.3946 0.009 0.3760 
Gearing 0.605 0.1317 0.592 0.1309 
Dummy-industry 0.497 0.414 0.235 0.7028 
Dividend yield 0.315 0.0032 0.336 0.0012 
Quick ratio 0.001 0.8630 0.0004 0.9451 
Dummy if less than 2 non-
executives 0.141 0.7204 0.095 0.8074 
Log (delta shares) -0.144 0.0302 -0.158 0.0495 
Log (delta options) 0.154 0.0396 0.227 0.0523 
Log (vega) -0.025 0.6902 -0.097 0.3431 
D_small*Log (delta shares) -0.052 0.5312   
D_small*Log (delta options) -0.064 0.6591   
D_small*Log(vega) 0.141 0.7086   
D_small_cap*Log(delta shares)   -0.008 0.9263 
D_small_cap*Log(delta options)   -0.137 0.3997 
D_small_cap*Log(vega)   0.128 0.3287 
Total observations 317  317  
Hedgers 95  95  
Non-hedgers 222  222  
McFadden R-square 16.0%  16.1%  
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Table 5  
Model of differences in the effects of managerial incentives in companies where 
managers hold smaller proportions of shares.  
 
This table reports the results of the logit regression on the relation between hedging 
and managerial wealth and risk incentives including a proxy for managerial share 
ownership. The dependent variable is an indicator variable, which takes the value of 
one if the firm hedges. In Model 5, we interact a dummy variable, which takes the 
value of one if the directors hold 5% or less of the shares outstanding with our 
managerial incentive variables.  
 
Definition of Variables: Log (total assets) is the natural log of total assets. Market-to-
book value is the ratio of market value of equity to book value of equity. Gearing is 
the ratio of book value of debt to market value of equity. Dummy industry is a 
dummy variable, which takes the value of one if the company belongs to one of the 
following industries: coal mining, petroleum refining, oil and gas extraction. Dividend 
yield is the companies‟ year-end dividend yield. Quick ratio is ratio of current assets 
to current liabilities. Dummy if less than 2 non-executives is a dummy variable, which 
takes the value of one if the company has less than two non-executive directors in the 
board. Log(delta shares) is the natural log of change in the value of the executive 
directors‟ portfolio of shares as the share price changes by 1%. Log(delta options) is 
the natural log of change in the value of the executive directors‟ portfolio of options 
as the share price changes by 1%. Log(vega) is the natural log of the change in the 
value of the executive directors‟ portfolio of options as volatility changes by 1%. D_5 
is a dummy variable which takes the value of one if the executive directors hold less 
than 5% of the companies‟ shares outstanding. 
Model 5 
Variable Coefficient p-
value 
Intercept -6.958 0.0000 
Log (total assets) 0.369 0.0002 
Market value to book value  0.011 0.3539 
Gearing 0.480 0.1502 
Dummy-industry 0.193 0.7543 
Dividend yield 0.325 0.0039 
Quick ratio -0.001 0.8874 
Dummy if less than 2 non-executives 0.214 0.5769 
Log (delta shares) -0.274 0.0007 
Log (delta options) 0.172 0.0541 
Log (vega) 0.0002 0.9969 
D_5*Log (delta shares) 0.204 0.0425 
D_5*Log (delta options) -0.038 0.7760 
D_5*Log(vega) -0.089 0.4359 
   
Total observations 317  
Hedgers 95  
Non-hedgers 222  
McFadden R-square 17.2%  
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Table 6   
Models of determinants of managerial wealth and risk incentives.  
This table estimates three tobit regression models (since some of the executive teams 
do not hold options or shares) for the managerial incentives variables. We use the 
predicted value from these models as explanatory variables of the risk management 
model in a two-stage least squares framework. In Model 6, the dependent variable is 
the log of the delta of options. In Model 7, the dependent variable is the log of the 
delta of shares. In Model 8, the dependent variable is the log of vega.  
Definition of Variables: Log (total assets) is the natural log of total assets. 
Log(Volatility) is the natural log of the annualised standard deviation of daily share 
price returns of up to one year prior to the year-end. Market-to-book value is the ratio 
of market value of equity to book value of equity. Past return is the average monthly 
share price return over the two years prior to the year-end. Log (cash) is the natural 
log of the sum of salary, benefits, and bonus. Gearing is the ratio of book value of 
debt to market value of equity. Dummy-ind2 is a dummy variable, which takes the 
value of one if the company belongs to one of the following industries: utility, 
banking, insurance. Dummy if less than 2 non-executives is a dummy variable, which 
takes the value of one if the company has less than two non-executive directors in the 
board. Dummy if no remuneration committee is a dummy variable, which takes the 
value of one if the company does not have a remuneration committee or if it does not 
disclose the existence of such committee. Number of executives is the number of 
executive directors on the board. Percentage of non-exec is the percentage of non-
executive directors on the board. Log(vega) is the natural log of the change in the 
value of the executive directors‟ portfolio of options as volatility changes by 1%. 
Log(delta shares) is the natural log of change in the value of the executive directors‟ 
portfolio of shares as the share price changes by 1%.  Log(delta options) is the natural 
log of change in the value of the executive directors‟ portfolio of options as the share 
price changes by 1%. 
Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 
Variable Coef. p-value Coef. p-value Coef. p-value 
Intercept -0.597 0.7481 6.305 0.0258 -2.773 0.2440 
Log (total assets) 0.085 0.5004 -0.358 0.0221 -0.109 0.3880 
Log (Volatility) 0.357 0.2860 -0.401 0.1994 -0.001 0.9971 
Market value to book value 0.002 0.1254 0.005 0.0586 -0.001 0.7582 
Past return 7.271 0.0267 5.507 0.0528 -11.785 0.0036 
Log (cash) 0.145 0.4173 0.634 0.0007 0.360 0.2659 
Gearing -0.276 0.0779 0.142 0.3867 0.192 0.1857 
Dummy-ind2 -0.748 0.0804 0.356 0.2784 -0.176 0.7048 
Dummy if less than 2 non-
executives -1.083 0.0203 -1.581 0.0035 1.092 0.0262 
Dummy if no remuneration 
committee -0.217 0.5081 0.062 0.8138 -0.604 0.1175 
Number of executives 0.129 0.494 0.225 0.0983 0.040 0.8542 
Percentage of non-exec. -0.750 0.6195 -2.469 0.1028 1.100 0.522 
Log (vega) 0.868 0.0000 0.030 0.4704   
Log (delta shares)     -0.097 0.0832 
Log (delta options)     1.300 0.000 
Total observations 317  317  317  
Censored observations 61  22  82  
Adjusted R-square 64.6%  19.9%  64.0%  
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Table 7  
Two-stage models of hedging likelihood.  
 
This table uses the predicted values of the coefficients of the three tobit models in 
Table 6 as instruments of the logit regression model. In Model 9, we treat the 
incentive variables as endogenous variables, which produces a significant difference 
in the results. In Model 10, we interact our D_5 dummy variable with the managerial 
incentives.  
 
Definition of Variables: Log (Total assets) is the natural log of total assets, at year- 
end. Market-to-book value is the ratio of market value of equity to book value of 
equity. Gearing is the ratio of book value of debt to market value of equity. Dummy 
industry is a dummy variable, which takes the value of one if the company belongs to 
one of the following industries: coal mining, petroleum refining, oil and gas 
extraction. Dividend yield is the companies‟ year-end dividend yield. Quick ratio is 
ratio of current assets to current liabilities. Dummy if less than 2 non-executives is a 
dummy variable, which takes the value of one if the company has less than two non-
executive directors in the board. Pred_Log(delta shares) is the estimated value of 
natural log of the delta of shares using Model 7 of Table 6. Pred_Log(delta options) is 
the estimated value of natural log of the delta of options using Model 6 of Table 6. 
Pred_Log(vega) is the estimated value of the natural log of the vega of options using 
Model 8 of Table 6. D_5 is a dummy variable, which takes the value of one if the 
executive directors hold less than 5% of the companies‟ shares outstanding. 
 
Model 9 Model 10 
Variable Coefficient p-value Coefficient p-value 
Intercept -7.571 0.0001 -7.685 0.0001 
Log (total assets) 0.383 0.0004 0.386 0.0003 
Market value to book value  0.01 0.4162 0.010 0.3778 
Gearing 0.583 0.1575 0.447 0.2045 
Dummy-industry 0.216 0.7103 0.153 0.8064 
Dividend yield 0.296 0.0041 0.308 0.0063 
Quick  ratio 0.001 0.7991 0.001 0.8158 
Dummy if less than 2 non-
executives 0.129 0.7280 0.174 0.6423 
Pred_Log (delta shares) -0.073 0.4863 -0.164 0.1924 
Pred_Log (delta options) 0.015 0.8251 0.100 0.3413 
Pred_Log (vega) 0.105 0.1413 0.065 0.5036 
D_5*Pred_Log(delta shares)   0.348 0.0009 
D_5*Pred_Log(delta options)   -0.298 0.0745 
D_5*Pred_Log(vega)   0.145 0.3926 
Total observations 317  317  
Hedgers 95  95  
Non-hedgers 222  222  
McFadden R-square 13.6%  16.5%  
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Table 8   
Robustness tests.  
 
This table reports the results when we redefined our dependent variable as it is commonly defined in 
the literature (derivative users) and we re-estimate Models 4, 5, and 10 as Models 11, 12, and 13. 
Definition of Variables: Log (total assets) is the natural log of total assets, at year-end. Market-to-book 
value is the ratio of market value of equity to book value of equity. Gearing is the ratio of book value 
of debt to market value of equity. Dummy industry is a dummy variable, which takes the value of one 
if the company belongs to one of the following industries: coal mining, petroleum refining, oil and gas 
extraction. Dividend yield is the companies‟ year-end dividend yield. Quick ratio is ratio of current 
assets to current liabilities. Dummy if less than 2 non-executives is a dummy variable, which takes the 
value of one if the company has less than two non-executive directors in the board. Log(delta shares) is 
the natural log of change in the value of the executive directors‟ portfolio of shares as the share price 
changes by 1%.  Log(delta options) is the natural log of change in the value of the executive directors‟ 
portfolio of options as the share price changes by 1%. Log(vega) is the natural log of the change in the 
value of the executive directors‟ portfolio of options as volatility changes by 1%. D_5 is a dummy 
variable, which takes the value of one if the executive directors hold less than 5% of the companies‟ 
shares outstanding. Pred_Log(delta shares) is the estimated value of natural log of the delta of shares 
using Model 7 of Table 6. Pred_Log(delta options) is the estimated value of natural log of the delta of 
options using Model 6 of Table 6. Pred_Log(vega) is the estimated value of the natural log of the vega 
of options using Model 8 of Table 6. 
Model 11 Model 12 Model 13 
Variable Coef. p-value Coef. p-value Coef. p-value 
Intercept -7.277 0.0001 -7.494 0.0000 -8.263 0.0001 
Log (total assets) 0.343 0.0011 0.376 0.0004 0.369 0.0010 
Market value to book 
value  0.007 0.4751 0.007 0.4735 
0.004 0.5681 
Gearing 0.525 0.1437 0.439 0.1148 0.462 0.1387 
Dummy-industry 0.673 0.2914 0.598 0.3562 0.639 0.3310 
Dividend yield 0.325 0.0007 0.292 0.0030 0.273 0.0037 
Quick  ratio -0.013 0.1005 -0.014 0.0652 -0.013 0.1475 
Dummy if less than 2 
non-executives -0.097 0.8163 -0.075 0.8596 
 
0.026 
 
0.9510 
Log (delta shares) -0.072 0.1614 -0.199 0.0246   
Log (delta options) 0.063 0.3583 0.170 0.0733   
Log (vega) -0.003 0.9793 -0.023 0.7585   
D_5*Log(delta shares)   0.204 0.0614   
D_5*Log(delta options)   -0.276 0.0760   
D_5*Log(vega)   0.079 0.5570   
Pred_Log (delta shares)     0.045 0.7490 
Pred_Log (delta options)     0.050 0.6301 
Pred_Log (vega)     0.092 0.3681 
D_5*Pred_Log(delta 
shares) 
  
  
0.199 0.0712 
D_5*Pred_Log(delta 
options) 
  
  
-0.044 0.7811 
D_5*Pred_Log(vega)     -0.159 0.3440 
Total observations 317  317  317  
Hedgers 70  70  70  
Non-hedgers 247  247  247  
McFadden R-square 15.0%  16.5%  16.1%  
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